A.A.R.P. v. Trump Analysis

Supreme Court Case Regarding AEA Removals

Case Name: A. A. R. P., ET AL. v. DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. (No. 24A1007)

Court: Supreme Court of the United States

Date of Order: May 16, 2025

Source Documents:

• Excerpts from “24a1007_g2bh.pdf” (Per Curiam Opinion, Kavanaugh Concurrence, Alito Dissent)

Key Action: The Supreme Court grants an application for an injunction, grants certiorari, vacates the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, and remands the case for further proceedings. The Court enjoins the government from removing the named plaintiffs and putative class members under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) pending further lower court action and potential certiorari review.

Summary:

This case arises from the President’s invocation of the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to remove Venezuelan nationals identified as members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated foreign terrorist organization. The applicants are two detainees identified as TdA members and a putative class of similarly situated detainees held in U.S. detention facilities in the Northern District of Texas. The core issue addressed by the Supreme Court’s May 16, 2025, order is the denial of injunctive relief by the District Court and the subsequent dismissal of the appeal by the Fifth Circuit, specifically concerning the procedural due process rights of these detainees facing summary removal under the AEA.

The Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion holds that the Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the District Court’s inaction in the face of an imminent threat of removal constituted a “constructive denial” of an injunction. The Court emphasizes that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process in removal proceedings, including adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. While not deciding the legality of the removals under the AEA itself, the Court finds that the notice provided to the detainees (roughly 24 hours before removal, without information on how to exercise due process rights) was insufficient. The Court grants temporary injunctive relief to the named plaintiffs and the putative class to preserve jurisdiction and ensure that the question of what notice is due is properly adjudicated by the lower courts.

The concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh supports the temporary injunction to allow the judiciary to determine the legality of the removals under the AEA and the required notice. He highlights the urgency and importance of the legal questions, suggesting a preference for the Supreme Court to resolve the issues directly and expeditiously.

The dissenting opinion by Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, argues that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction, that the applicants failed to meet the requirements for injunctive relief (particularly the likelihood of success on the merits of classwide relief), and that granting certiorari before judgment is unwarranted. The dissent contests the characterization of the District Court’s actions as a constructive denial, arguing that the court was acting diligently and that the evidence of imminent removal before the District Court was weak. The dissent also expresses significant skepticism about the availability and propriety of class-action relief in habeas proceedings and criticizes the majority for effectively issuing classwide temporary relief without a rigorous analysis of class certification, particularly in light of the District Court’s subsequent order denying class certification.

Main Themes and Important Ideas/Facts:

1. Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) for Removal: The case stems from the President using the AEA (Rev. Stat. §4067, 50 U. S. C. §21) to remove Venezuelan nationals alleged to be members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated foreign terrorist organization (Presidential Proclamation No. 10903).

• Quote (Per Curiam): “The President has invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), Rev. Stat. §4067, 50 U. S. C. §21, to remove Venezuelan nationals who are members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated foreign terrorist organization. See Presidential Proclamation No. 10903, 90 Fed. Reg. 13033 (2025).”

1. Due Process Rights of Aliens in Removal Proceedings: A central tenet of the per curiam opinion is that aliens, even those subject to the AEA, are entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment in the context of removal proceedings. This includes the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.

• Quote (Per Curiam): “‘[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings.’” (quoting Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3)).
• Quote (Per Curiam): “We have long held that ‘no person shall be’ removed from the United States ‘without opportunity, at some time, to be heard.'” (quoting The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101 (1903)).

1. Adequacy of Notice Under the AEA: The Supreme Court found that the notice provided to the detainees was constitutionally inadequate. Notice must be “reasonably calculated” to apprise interested parties and afford “a reasonable time” to act. The notice given (roughly 24 hours before removal, without information on how to seek habeas relief) did not meet this standard.

• Quote (Per Curiam): “Notice that is ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties’ and that ‘afford[s] a reasonable time . . . to make [an] appearance.'” (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950)).
• Quote (Per Curiam): “Under these circumstances, notice roughly 24 hours before removal, devoid of information about how to exercise due process rights to contest that removal, surely does not pass muster.”

1. Requirement for Notice Allowing Detainees to “Actually Seek Habeas Relief”: Drawing on a prior per curiam opinion (J. G. G.), the Court reiterates that AEA detainees must receive notice allowing them to reasonably contact counsel, file a petition, and pursue relief before removal.

• Quote (Per Curiam): “Accordingly, in J. G. G., this Court explained—with all nine Justices agreeing—that ‘AEA detainees must receive notice . . . that they are subject to removal under the Act . . . within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief’ before removal. 604 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 3).”

1. Appellate Jurisdiction over Constructive Denials of Injunctions: The Court clarifies that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders that have the “practical effect of refusing an injunction.” A district court’s inaction in the face of “extreme urgency and a high risk of ‘serious, perhaps irreparable,’ consequences” can constitute such a refusal, justifying immediate appeal.

• Quote (Per Curiam): “Appellate courts have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders that have ‘the practical effect of refusing an injunction.’” (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 84 (1981)).
• Quote (Per Curiam): “Here the District Court’s inaction—not for 42 minutes but for 14 hours and 28 minutes—had the practical effect of refusing an injunction to detainees facing an imminent threat of severe, irreparable harm.”

1. Imminent Threat of Removal and Irreparable Harm: The per curiam opinion emphasizes the evidence suggesting imminent removals and the potential irreparable harm (deportation, particularly to a location where indefinite detention is alleged) to justify intervention and characterize the District Court’s delay as a constructive denial.

• Quote (Per Curiam): “Had the detainees been removed from the United States to the custody of a foreign sovereign on April 19, the Government may have argued, as it has previously argued, that no U. S. court had jurisdiction to order relief.”
• Quote (Per Curiam): “The detainees’ interests at stake are accordingly particularly weighty.”
• Quote (Dissent): “The record that was before the District Court on April 18 (which is the same record that was before us at midnight on that date) included no concrete evidence that any removals were so imminent that a ruling had to be made immediately.”

1. Temporary Injunctive Relief for a Putative Class: The Court grants temporary injunctive relief not only to the named plaintiffs but also to the putative class members to preserve jurisdiction while the notice issue is adjudicated. It rejects the idea that the government can defeat class treatment by promising to treat named plaintiffs differently.

• Quote (Per Curiam): “Finally, this Court may properly issue temporary injunctive relief to the putative class in order to preserve our jurisdiction pending appeal.”
• Quote (Per Curiam): “And because courts may issue temporary relief to a putative class, see 2 W. Rubenstein, Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions §4:30 (6th ed. 2022 and Supp. 2024), we need not decide whether a class should be certified as to the detainees’ due process claims in order to temporarily enjoin the Government from removing putative class members while the question of what notice is due is adjudicated.”
• Quote (Dissent): “The Court asserts that ‘courts may issue temporary relief to a putative class’ without ‘decid[ing] whether a class should be certified.’ Ante, at 7. In support of that proposition, the Court cites to no precedent of this Court.”

1. Jurisdictional Dispute and Critique of Lower Court Actions: The dissent strongly disputes the Court’s finding of jurisdiction, arguing that the District Court acted reasonably and was not presented with sufficiently strong evidence of imminent harm to justify the applicants’ demand for immediate action. The dissent criticizes the applicants’ attorneys for issuing an “ultimatum” to the District Court.

• Quote (Dissent): “I cannot join the decision of the Court. First and most important, we lack jurisdiction and therefore have no authority to issue any relief.”
• Quote (Dissent): “Whether or not the actions taken by applicants’ attorneys are thought to be justified under the circumstances, delivering such an ultimatum to a district court judge… represented a very stark departure from what is usually regarded as acceptable practice.”

1. Availability of Class Relief in Habeas Proceedings: The dissent raises significant doubts about whether class actions (under Rule 23) are permissible in habeas corpus proceedings, arguing there is no historical support and that the device is generally “ill-suited” for the individualized nature of habeas claims.

• Quote (Dissent): “First, it is doubtful that class relief may be obtained in a habeas proceeding. We have never so held, and it is highly questionable whether it is permitted.”

1. Typicality Requirement for Class Certification: The dissent argues that the named plaintiffs are not typical representatives of the putative class because they have already received assurances from the government that they will not be removed while their individual habeas petitions are pending.

• Quote (Dissent): “Here, however, the main interim relief sought on behalf of the putative class—adequate notice of plans for removal under the AEA and an opportunity to contest such removal in court, see Application 17–18; Reply 5–7—is not needed by either A. A. R. P. or W. M. M., who already have a pending habeas proceeding and a promise that they will not be removed until that proceeding concludes.”

1. Impact of Subsequent District Court Order Denying Class Certification: The dissent highlights that the District Court has since conducted a rigorous analysis and denied class certification, including as to the notice claims. The dissent finds the Supreme Court’s temporary classwide relief and instructions to the Fifth Circuit to adjudicate the notice rights of the putative class without requiring a class certification analysis extraordinary in light of this development.

• Quote (Dissent): “That development makes the relief issued by the Court today all the more extraordinary. Purporting to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, the Court issues ‘preliminary relief’ to a putative class that the District Court has explicitly refused to certify, and it does so without providing any substantive analysis suggesting that the District Court’s analysis of the class certification issue was incorrect.”

1. Grant of Certiorari Before Judgment and Remand: The Court takes the unusual step of granting certiorari before judgment from the Fifth Circuit and remanding the case. It instructs the Fifth Circuit to address both the preliminary injunction factors as to the named plaintiffs’ underlying AEA removal claims and the issue of what notice is due for the putative class’s due process claims.

• Quote (Per Curiam): “We now construe the application as a petition for writ of certiorari from the decision of the Fifth Circuit. See Reply 15. We grant the petition as well as the application for injunction pending further proceedings, vacate the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, and remand for further proceedings.”
• Quote (Per Curiam): “In resolving the detainees’ appeal, the Fifth Circuit should address (1) all the normal preliminary injunction factors… as to the named plaintiffs’ underlying habeas claims… and (2) the issue of what notice is due, as to the putative class’s due process claims against summary removal.”
• Quote (Dissent): “Instead of merely ruling on the application that is before us… the Court takes the unusual step of granting certiorari before judgment, summarily vacating the judgment below dismissing the applicants’ appeal, and remanding the case to the Court of Appeals with directions regarding the issues that court should address.”

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court’s order in A. A. R. P. v. Trump is a significant development in challenges to the government’s use of the Alien Enemies Act for summary removals. While stopping short of ruling on the legality of the AEA removals themselves, the Court forcefully reaffirms the due process rights of aliens, particularly the right to adequate notice and an opportunity to seek judicial review before removal. The decision to grant temporary classwide injunctive relief is notable, especially given the dissent’s concerns about jurisdiction, the evidence of urgency, and the availability of class actions in habeas proceedings. The case is now remanded to the Fifth Circuit for further proceedings, with specific instructions from the Supreme Court, indicating a complex and potentially protracted legal battle over the scope of the AEA and the due process rights of those subjected to it. The fact that other district courts have issued conflicting rulings on the underlying legal issues underscores the need for higher court resolution, as highlighted in Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence.